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The following Resolutions, offered by Mr. Memminger, with sundry others 
offered by other members of the House of Representatives, on the samo 
subject, were under discussion in Committee of the Whole, on Saturday, 9th 
December, 1848: 
1. Resolr,ed, That it is unwise and inexpedient for a State to engage in Banking, or to subject 
its resources to the casualties of Banking operations. 
2. Resolved, That the Bank of the State is founded on this erroneous policy, and exposes the 
public Treasury and the public faith to the hazards incident to Banks. 
3. Resolr,ed, That it is inexpedient to recharter the Bank of the State, and that measures ought 
n,ow to be taken to wind np its concerns during the period of its present charter 
4. Resolved, That a Special Committee of each Honse be appointed, to devise and report at the 
next session, the proper measures for carrying into effect the last Resolutiou 
When Mr. Mcmminger addressed the Committee to the purport of the Speech 
which follows : 
Ma. CHAIRMAN : I intend to discuss the question before the House, as one 
altogether of State Policy; and that I may not be led aside hereafter by per-
sonal issues, I shall dispose at once of all such considerations here, at the 
commencement of my remarks. 
The force of what I may say is sought to be broken in advance, either by 
imputing to the opponents of the Bank motives of interest, or a desire to injure 
those who conduct its affairs. On the first point, I have only to say, that 
there is no action which the State can take in relation to any Bank, which can 
cause me to gain or lose to the extent of five hundred dollars. The second 
imputation can in no way apply to me, inasmuch as a lifetime passed near each 
other, has been one of continued kindness and good feeling between myself and 
the President of the Bank. These relations have been preserved through the 
shocks of party excitement and contention; and at this moment, the only pain 
which I feel in entering upon this discussion, is, that it must produce trials and 
difficulty to a friend, whom in his present state of health, I would gladly have 
saved from this addition.. But events over which I have no control have forcecI 
this subject upon us. I have neither sought nor desired the unenviable task 
which is upon me. I find myself at a post which the State requires me to 
maintain, and I have no a,Iternative but to discharge my duty. 
\ 
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The great question which has been brought up for our consideration by the 
Message of the Governor, and by the various Resolutions submitted, is, whether 
it is for the interest of the people of South Carolina, that the Bank of the 
State should be brought to a close, or whether its Charter should be renewed? 
Those who think with me, are of opinion that the union of Bank .and State is 
an unsound and injurious connection, mutually corrupting and mutually 
productive of evil; and that as we have succeeded in dissolving this connection 
in the General Government, we ought equally to strive to procure its separation 
from the State Government. 
In ·order to develope the subject more fully, it will be proper in the first 
place, to explain the connection which exists between the Bank of the State 
and the State of South Carolina, and to show how far the State is involved 
in the concerns of the Bank. 
The Capital of the Bank consists of two distinct parts. The first part 
amounts at present to $1,123,357 00; and is made up Qf various portions of 
Bank Stock and other funds which the State owned at the time the Bank was 
originally chartered. To this must be added, what is called the.Sinking Fund, 
amounting at present to $541,416 00 ; which is made up of the annual profits 
of the Bank, remaining after paying the public debt, and also of the sum of 
$200,000 received from the Surplus Revenue of the United States. These 
sums, amounting to $1,664,773, are e11tirely the property of the State, and 
constitute the real banking capital of the Bank. 
But besides this, there is a second part, composed entirely of Borrowed 
Capital, which has been placed in the possession of the Bank, and is called 
part of its capital. This consists of about two millions of dollars, which was 
borrowed for the ostensible purpose of rebuilding the City of Charleston. Only 
about one million of this was ever needed to be lent out to the citizens of 
Charleston, and the remainder has been used by the Bank in its businel!ll 
operations. The money was all borrowed on the Bonds of the State, and 
consequently the State is answerable for tho whole of it; and any loss which 
tho Bank may make, must of course be made good by the State. The funds 
therefore which the Bank is using, and which either belong to the State, or 
are borrowed on her credit, amount in round numbers to three and a half 
millions of dollars. 
Tb ere is still a further connection between the Bank and the State, which 
it is necessary to develope. By the charter of the Bank, the State bas pledged 
her faith for its support, and in consequence thereof, the State is liable for the 
issues and deposites of the Bank. At present these amount to $1,728,962, 
and must be added to the previous sum of 3f millions, or more accurately, 
$3,586,632 ; making the total sum of $5,315,594, for which the finances of 
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the State are involved with the Bank; and every dollar of which is at the risk 
of the State. An immense machine, involving nearly twenty times the annual 
tax income of the State ! 
Such a machine, I will proceed to show, is contrary to the spirit of our 
Government, and to the principles of constitutional liberty. 
I. It is so complex in its nature, that few have time or opportunity to 
understand it. In a government like ours, which is to be conducted by the 
people, all its arrangements should be made as simple as possible. All expe-
rience proves, that the more completely any department is removed from popular 
scrutiny and inspection, the more certainly does it become corrupt. Even a 
mode of collecting taxes which is complex and removed from observation, is 
found to be onerous and repugnant to republican principles. But here is an 
institution vastly more extensive than the whole State Treasury, which has 
absorbed all the funds of the State, and involves her in a matter of five millions; 
which bas drunk up the original State Capital, Sinking Fund, Fire Loan and 
Surplus Revenue, and must needs be managed by men expert in a particular 
science, and which makes out its annual accounts in statements which few 
ever read, because few only can spare the time to examine and comprehend 
them. What a contrast to the simple machinery of the State Treasury, where 
a couple of Treasurers receive the taxes of the Upper and Lower country, and 
pay them out as directed by the Representatives of the people at the annual 
meeting of the Legislature. 
2. The Constitution of South Carolina vest.s the Legislative authority of 
the State in the Senate and House of Representatives ; but the charter of the 
Bank vests a larger Legislative authority in a Board of Directors sitting in a 
Bank parlor in Charleston, veiled in the mystery created by an oath of secrecy. 
If an appropriation were asked from the Legislature for any public work, the 
State Constitution will not permit a grant to be made until a bill shall have 
been read on three separate days in the Senate, and on three separate days in 
the House of Representatives. Of course upon each reading, public discus-
sion of the measure may be had; and as each House is required by the Con-
stitution to keep a Journal of its proceedings, and by it.s rules to record the 
yeas and nays when required, the people may be kept fully advised of all that 
is done by their representatives-and so jealously does the Constitution watch 
over this legislative authority, that its great right arm, the taxing power, is 
expressly retained in the House of Representatives, and the Senate is not 
permitted to originate a bill to raise taxes. 
But the power which is thus so jealously watched, as to be refused even to 
the Senate of the State, is given at large by the Bank charter to t~e Directors 
of the Bank. Nay, they even have power which the Legislature itself cannot 
•' 
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undo. They have power to contract debts to tbe extent of twice their capital, 
atJd can thus at pleasure impose upon the State a debt of seven millions, which 
the peoplo would be obliged to meet, whether they approved it or not. And 
that too, not upon open discussion upon a bill to be read three times, but upon 
a mere order of a Board made in half an hour, without any discussion, or if 
upon discussion, the reasons veiled by the impenetrable folds of an oath of 
:secrecy. 
Here then is a clear surrender to an irresponsible obligarchy of the great 
constitutional powers of Government-the power to borrow money on the faith 
of the public, and the power to apply it at pleasure. The only barrier which 
bas ever been yet found against the invasions of tyranny-that with which 
1Iampden and Pym, and their associates, combatted the first inroads of the 
tyrant Charles; that shield which John Hancock and our brave Revolutionary 
fathers retained at the expense of a death grapple with the mighty power of 
England-is surrendered to a small Board of Bank Directors, in the hope, 
forsooth, that we may make money by the operation; thus bargaining away the 
,liberties of the people for a mess of pottage. 
But not only hae the State surrendered to this Bank the power to borrow 
money, and thereby to tax the people at will, but she has actually allowed 
them power to patronize schemes of enterprise, which the Legislature itself 
would scarcely venture to exercise. The Bank may, without consulting the 
Legislature, or the people, engage in any scheme-commercial, manufacturing, 
or speculative-which it may 11ee fit to foster. While we are gravely debating 
here whether we shall cut off five hundred dollars from, the salary of the 
Adjutant General, or whether we shall save for the State the salary of a 
Superintendent of Public Worke, this other Legislature may be subscribing 
hundreds of thousands to a Georgia Railroad, or embarking in a Bank spec• 
ulation of millione, or creating any number of Bank officers and salaries, to be 
paid from that large treasury which the State has placed in the keeping of the 
Bank. 
Gentlemen may suppose I am indulging in pictures of the imagination, or 
drawing upon far·fetched possibilities. Unfortunately, I speak the words of 
sober truth and reason. Take up the Bank 8tatement now on your table, and 
you will find that near half a million of the public money in the hands of the 
Bank, is now invested in Railroad securities and Bank Stocks. We have been 
discussing here in the Legislature for more than two years, whether we shall 
aid the great public Railroads from Columbia to Greenville and Charlotte, and 
with a great effort we have at last agreed to subscribe to them a half million of 
dollars. The Bank could have settled this matter for them in half an hour, 
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their statement. Very probably it was wise and proper for the Bank to aid 
these enterprises. I am not now canvassing that point. But I think I may 
venture to say, that many years must have elapsed, before any effort could have 
:succeeded in persuading this Legislature, so to apply the moneys of South 
Carolina. My design is accomplished when I show the fact. That fact proves 
most strikingly how · much greater is the power, and how much smaller the 
responsibility, of our Bank than of our Legislature. 
But this is not all. The Representatives of the people would hesitate much 
before they ventured to embark the public moneys in subscribing to a Bank 
speculation, or in building up Manufacturing Companies But when the Bank 
of Charleston was established, this other Legislature did not hesitate to 
subscribe one million eight hundred thousand dollars to its stock, on a mere 
spt1culation ; nor has the Bank hesitated to assist various manufacturing 
companies by loans, all of which may have been made upon just views of 
expediency; but certainly are much bolder measures than could have been carried 
through the Constitutional Legislature of the State. 
All these transactions were made by the Board of Directors ; and as far as 
that is a check, had the benefit of it. But there are other transactions of the 
Bank, in which the State may be involved to the extent of thousands, without 
even the intervention of the Board of Directors. The whole is1mes of the Bank 
are under the control of the President and Cashier, and by any combination 
between them, or even at the will of the Cashier alone, the circulation of the 
Bank may be increased to any extent he may please. It is unfortunately too 
true, that both Presidents and Cashiers have been found who have betrayed 
their trust; and although I have no doubt but that the present officers of the 
Bank are perfectly honest, yet in establishing a great national irietitution, we 
must take it for granted that it will be managed by men of like imperfection 
with those who have managed other institutions It is within the knowledge 
of many who hear me, that two of the private Bank~ have suffered considerably 
by notes surreptitiously issued 'through the fault or negligence of the Cashier. 
The same thing may happen 'IVith the Bank of the State to any extent, and 
the people are thus exposed to a danger which few people are aware of, and 
which unfortunately cannot be discovered until many years afterwards-
possibly not until the Bank shall have been wound up. 
3. In the third place, it will appear that the .Bank of the State is the real 
Treasury of the State, and as such, it violates the spirit of all those guards 
which the Constitution in its wisdom places around the people's Treasury. 
From what has been already said, it is apparent that much the larger portion 
uf the funds of the State is in the keeping of the Bank. The Capital of the 
Bank, the Sinking Fund, the Surplus Revenue, the Dividends from the 
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Railroad-even the general taxes themselves, all fall into the hands of the 
Bank, and are administered by men who hold office indefinitely, frequently for 
life. When we consider the jealousy which the Constitution exhibits on this 
score, it renders the Bank still more anomalous. By the 1st Section, 6t.h 
Article of Constitution, the Treasurers of the State are to hold their offices only 
for four years, and then they are ineligible for a term. The Constitution 
evidently thought it unsafe to place the public moneys in any bands for more 
than four years. But in the Bank, where ten times as much public money 
passes, the officers remain for life. The President and Cashier are re-elected 
as a matter of course ; and when a Director is changed, it is merely because 
either some more urgent competitor bas jostled him from his place, or because 
he is tired of the continued struggle to keep himself before a nominating 
Committee. 
So too the State Constitution, Article 1, Section 17, enacts that no money 
shall be drawn from the Treasury, but by the authority of the Legislature. 
But from this other Treasury, money is drawn at the will of the Directors, to 
buy houses and stocks, and to pay salaries at their pleasure. And what is 
infinitely more dangerous, money is borrowed on the public faith, to be loaned 
out to themselves or their friends, at their own absolute discretion, without 
check or accountability. 
I cannot exhibit this extraordinary feature in our State Institutions in a 
more striking light than as it is depicted by one of the warmest supporters 
of the Bank, the late Comptroller General Elmore, the brother of the present 
President. "The State (he says) presents the anomaly in finance of placing 
not only a large Banking Capital, but the whole of its Treasury, in the hands 
of a few individuals, with no other security for their faithful and honest man-
agement than their individual character. Character is certainly one of the 
best securities which can be obtained for the discharge of public duties, but I 
can see no reason why others should not be added. It is in vain to say, until 
the human character undergoes a thorough change, that you can fill the 
direction of your Bank with individuals who ,will serve the State from disin-
terested motives alone; and it is a question yet to be settled, whether you are 
not paying your Directors the highest price for their services, without possessing 
a corresponding security for their fidelity and honesty. It is known to be the 
practice of the Bank, to extend to each Director a credit to a considerable 
amount. As the State gives no compenrntion for the discharge of this very 
important trust, this cannot be considered unreasonable. But it is to be feared 
that many bad debts may be contracted thereby, and the State become a loser 
to an amount which would have exceeded a proper direct compensation to the 
Directors," &c. 
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4. Should then an Institution having such powers, and governed in t'hi,s 
manner, be connected with the State ? Surely it must be obvious to every 
one, that if the Bank of the United States was dangerous to the whole Union, 
a Bank of the State must be doubly dangerous to the people of a single State. 
The whole public Treasury is equally involved in all the casualties of J3anking. 
The provision made for paying the public debt, exists in what is called the 
Sinking Fund, and the whole of this Fund is lent out by the Bank Directors 
in common with the general funds of the Bank. Of course with a view to 
make more money, this fund is lent out to the very latest hour, and if in that 
last hour any commercial revulsion should take place, it would be impossible 
to call in the fund, and so the public faith would have to stand upon the chance 
of a Banking operation. I think it may be demonstrated, that such a state of 
things had actually occurred when the public debt became payable in 1846; 
and that most disastrous consequenced might have ensued, if the Bank had 
not received aid from the new public debt which was then created. 
Neither does it need a labored argument to prove, that borrowing money 
upon the public faith, to lend the same out to individuals, is a most unsound 
and vicious system. The Bank of the State now holds a million of dollars in 
this way. Can anything be more obvious, than that every dollar of this 
money is at the risk of the people ; and that the people are in fact the endorsers 
of those to whom the money is loaned ? Take for instance a single transac-
tion. One thousand dollars are borrowed in the name of the State, and the 
Bank lends the money to a Bank Director. If the Director should fail, the people 
must be taxed to pay the money to the public creditor from whom it was bor-
rowed; and the people thus become virtually endorser of this Bank Director. 
Can anything be more unsound in principle, or corrupting in practice? And 
yet this is the legitimate result of the union of Bank and State. 
I think, then, I may·fairly take it as demonstrated, that the Bank of the 
State is an institution at variance with the spirit of our Constitution-founded 
on erroneous principles, and contrary to those Republican maxims which lie at 
the basis of all constitutional liberty. 
5. The next proposition which I will endeavor to establish, is that the Bank 
of the State, from its very nature, operates to mislead and influence in a wrong 
direction President, Directors, and the Legislature itself; and ti at, if the Presi-
dent of the Bank be a politician, the Bank virtually gives a master to the State. 
Let it be observed in the first place, that the Directors are appointed by the 
Legislature; and when once in office, there is nothing to check them in making 
returns to those who have helped them into place. In a private Bank, the 
interest of the Director in the Stock, or the interest of the Stockholders 
themselves, would furnish some check. But on neither side do these influences 
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•operate in the Bank of the State. The member of the Legislature is tempted I 
:to favor as a Director the man who is likely to favor him with accommodation; . 
,and on the other hand, the Director is much more likely to favor a man of 
1political influence in the Legislature, than one of mere pecuniary credit. The 
:tendenc; of such a system on both parties must be most unfortunate ; and the 
experience of our Bank has most thoroughly verified it. For every one admits 
ithat the scramble for a seat at the Board of Directors, and the scenes of elec-
iioneering which are exhibited about this Hall, are anything but edifying to 
1the friends of morals and good order, and must even shock the sensibilities o 
1the friends of the Bank itself. 
But the most baneful influence is that which is produced upon the councils 
·of the country, by the secrecy which is wrapped around the concerns of the 
'Bank. Members of the Legislature become the subjects of its influence through 
iboth hope and fear. A man may have procured a large loan which it may 
ll'uin him to be called on to pay. A measure vitally interesting to the Bank 
:may come up for discussion, and this very man may be a member of the 
Legislature which is to act. Were it known that he was in the power of the 
:Bank, his influence would be lost, and his words would be unheeded. But 
1i!irouded in darkness, he is allowed to stand up here, and commend himself to 
his Bank supporters, or he may even be constrained or urged by them to take 
their part, and assist in sustaining their power. 
Again: The natural tendency of all power and inHuencc is to seek its own 
increase. The President and Directors are ever on the alert to increase the 
funds of the Bank, and thus to extend their own power and irrfluence. Every 
·occasion is seized to st:lve off the payment of public debt, or other demands 
which may diminish their resources; and the result is that Government Banks 
a.re ever the active fosterers of all schemes of extravagance and wasteful 
expenditure. We shall see in another part of this argument whether our 
Bank has escaped this evil tendency. 
The last consideration which I shall urge on this head, is that a State Bank, 
which ought in fact to regulate the currency and keep it sound, operates tbe 
direct contrary, and furnishes an unfortunate and evil example to other Banks. 
This consequence results from the impunity attending their delinquencie11. 
They know that the State will exact no punishment from the Bank for trying 
to make money. Instead therefore of keeping on hand a large supply of 
specie to redeem their paper, they increase their issues on the one hand, because 
that is profitable, and diminish their specie on the other, because they lose 
interest by keeping a large amount of coin; and having thus increased the 
disproportion to the greatest degree, they furnish an example, behind which the 
private banks gladly shelter themselves. The Legislature itself is prevented 
• 
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from doing its duty, because of the influence of the Bank itself upon their 
deliberations; and because of the just application of the adage, that the physician 
should first heal himself. The State is obliged to sit down, and see the besli 
interests of its people endangered by an unsound and fluctuating currency. 
6. Having thus established the radical unsoundness of principle upoµ which 
the Bank of the State is founded, I proceed in the next place to show, that the 
experience of other States unites in condemning all similar institutions, as 
baneful to the welfare of society. 
'.l'he Bank of the United States has furnished so striking a history on this 
subject, that our people (who lost three millions in its catastrophe) need not 
be reminded of its details. Its condemnation is written in those deeply traced 
characters of national suffering and abhorrence, which I trust will never be 
erased from the memory of our people. 
The Pet Banks (as they were familiarly termed) furnish another example 
of the disastrous union between Bank and State. Our State 0from the earliest 
moment, wrote her condemnation of that system; and as far back as 1836, her 
Legislature solemnly recorded her judgment that the public moneys should not 
be subjected to the casualties of Banking operations. In this opinion South 
Carolina has persevered up to the present time, repeating her solemn declaration 
at various periods, and satisfied that truth is on her side. Since the connection 
between Bank and State has been severed, we have the testimony of the 
President of the United St&tts, that the Government experienced not the 
slightest embarraslillllent throughout all the money trials of the Mexican war ; 
and that not a single dollar of public money has been lost to the Treasury. 
In other States of the Union, State Banks have been tried. North Carolina, 
Kentucky, Georgia, Alabama and Mississippi, have each in turn made an 
experiment, and the experience of each is a decided condemnation, as far as 
connection with the State is concerned. In Alabama, where the ·plan seemed 
successful for a time, the catastrophe was the most disastrous of any; 
and the history of its Bank is now the worst page in her annals. In no one 
instance can an example be found to save the system from general reprobation; 
and South Carolina is probably the only State in the Union in which an 
elaborate argument is required to convince her people of the evil tendency of 
this system. 
Even the Bank of England itself would be preferred, if it had less connection 
with the Government. In every attempt to unite them, something injuriou2 
to both has resulted ; and even one of the least burdensome arrangementa 
between the Government and the Bank, has received the significant naine of 
the Dead Weight. 
• 
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7. If anything further were necessary to settle the question, the experience 
and history of our own Bank would be conclusive. 
A very cursory view of its history will show, that whenever an occasion has 
arisen, it has swerved the State from her true course, and plunged her into 
complicated and embarrassing transactions, with which she would otherwise 
have had no connection. 
If we were even now clear of this Bank, the simplicity of our Treasury 
operations would surprise our whole people. The Sinking Fund in the hands 
of the Bank would pay off the whole debt of the State, and leave a surplus of 
some six thousand dollars. If therefore we could rid ourselves of the Bank, 
with all its mass of money borrowed to lend out again, its complication of Fire 
l;,oan, Surplus Revenue, et id genus omne, we would be able once more to 
have a Treasury which the people could understand. We would be entirely 
free from debt, with the exception of that loaned to build their houses to the 
citizens of Charleston, and the whole of this would be paid in a few years, as 
the payments come in. But as long as thiil incubus is permitted to nestle 
upon the State, so long must we expect complexity, difficulty and debt. 
I will not undertake to say that the Bank has caused all the debt which bas 
:been incurred .by the State, because my experience does not reach back to the 
Internal Improvement debt of 1820. But if the experience of the last ten 
· years 'be -tt guide, it may reasonably be inferred, that if there bad been no 
Bank, the internal Improvement projectors of 1820 must have known that 
they would have to tax the people to pay their debt, and that fact may have 
arrest.ed their progress. One thing is certain, that about the time this debt 
became payable, the State became involved in a most pernicious and unne-
cessary career of -debt, which has embarrassed her finances from that time to 
the present. 
In 1837; the Surplus Revenue of the United States to 'the extent of one 
million of dollars was paid to the State. This was delivered over for a time to 
the Bank, until it should be called in for the great Cincinnati Railroad, to 
which it was devoted. In the following year, 1838, Charleston was destroyed 
by the terrible fire which desolated that City. From every quarter of the 
State, the warm hearted sons of Carolina came together at the call of the 
Governor, to devise means of relief. As one of the Representatives of 
Charleston, it became my duty to be present, and in behalf of that afflicted 
City, we, her Representatives, bad prepared our plan, in which the relief we 
sought was proposed. No one man ever imagined that the Bank of the State 
had any concern in the matter one way or another. I remembcrwell the deep 
mortification, and 1 may say indignation, which I felt, when I saw a Bill 
produced by some of the active partisans of the Bank, evidently drawn b~fore-
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hand, in which for the first time was developed this scheme of dividing the 
charity of the State between the desolate City and the ever-meddling Bank. 
I found myself unable to submit to this most unnatural alliance, and endeavored 
to break the folds of the chain which was being forged. My colleagues 
appealed to me by every tie which binds human nature together. There sat 
our City, solitary, amid sackcloth and ashes, with the voice of lamentation 
sounding from her midst. And I, too, had felt constrained to add to her 
distresses, by fastening upon her the law which compelled the citizens to rebuild 
their dwellings of brick, then so dear, as almost to be a denial of common right. 
I felt the appeal to be too strong to allow me to stand in the way of relief, 
more especially as the mixture of the Bank was a question of expediency, and 
not of morals. I yielded my assent to the measure, just as the wretch on the 
verge of ruin admits the last per centage of the usurer-but even he may be 
brought forward as a witness to the extortion, as I am now, to the undue 
influence and unwarrantable interference of the Bank in this matter. 
I do not believe the assertion that the Legislature would not have aided 
Charleston, but for the expectation of benefit to the Bank. All that Charleston 
asked waB the credit of the State, and for that she offered security the most 
unexceptionable. So soon as the Legislature would have seen that, they would 
have yielded to their sympathies, and the measure would have passed by 
acclamation. In that form the debt would only have been one million, secured 
by personal security-mortgage of the Lands and Houses and policy of insur-
ance, together with the guarantee of the whole City of Charleston. Not a dollar 
of this loan ever can be lost to the State. 
But by the interference of the Bank, the debt of the State was doubled, and 
the second million, instead of being lent on real securities, was to be loaned on 
mere individual paper, subject to all the casualties of banking. And what was 
still worse, the Bon~s of the State were made to run ten years longer than the 
Loans to the people of Charleston, and for these ten years the Bank was 
expected to have the benefit of the other million also. Surely it is hazarding 
little to say, that in making such an arrangement the State was altogether 
swerved from her true course. 
In the following year, 1839, the embarrassments of the times compelled the 
Railroad Company to ask aid of the State, by advancing her subscription to 
the Railroad Company. It will be remembered, that the State had received in 
cash upwards of a million of dollars, which she had devoted to pay this 
subscription. But for the Bank, nothing could have been more simple than 
the aid which the State had it in her power to furnish. She had only to take 
her money already in hand and pay it to the Railroad Company, if she saw fit 
to aid them. The State did deem it wise to aid the Company; but the Bank 
-
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had loaned out all her money, and was unable to call it in at her desire. So 
the State was compelled to go into debt again, and issue her Bonds to pay her 
subscription, when she actually had in the hands of the Bank $200,000 more 
than the money which she was obliged to borrow. Is there the least hazard 
in affirming, that in incurring this debt the State was swerved from her true 
path of duty and interest? 
The same thing in substance occurred with the subscription to the Railroad 
Bank. It was suppo!ed by those who favored a subscription by the State to 
this Bank, that the subscription would be paid from the annual profits of the 
Bank of the State ; and although a clause was· put in the Act, authorizing a 
Loan to be taken up, in case the Bank did not find it convenient to pay, yet 
few supposed that this was anything but mere precaution. In fact, I can say 
for one, that it could never have received my support, if I had not supposed 
tha't the Bank would pay the subS'Cription in money. She did pay the 
subscription; but it WaB with money borrowed in the name of the State; she 
first availed herself of the power of creating new debt for the State, and thus 
another link was added to the chain. 
Finding the debts of the State increased on every side in this manner, and 
perceiving that the state of the times had prevented the Bank from disposing 
of all the State Bonds which the State had authorized under the Fire Loan, 
-some of us thought this a fitting opportunity for trying to diminish tbe State 
Debt. It appeared by the Bank's own showing, that she could not make six 
per cent. profit; and as the Bonds of the State when issued would bear an 
interest of six per cent., it was evident that the operation must result in loss. 
A motion was therefore made in this House, to instruct the Bank to cancel 
euch State Bonds as were on hand, and thus diminish by so much the debt of 
the State, and save her an annual loss of some five or ten thousand dollars· 
This motion was resisted by all the friends of the Bank on this floor, and was 
laid upon the table by a vote of a majority. And when the minority 
appeared at the bar of the House, and humbly requested leave to enter on the 
Journal the following Protest, they were treated with unceremonious rudeness, 
and their request rejected with some harshness: 
PROTEST. 
The undersigned, Representatives of the People of South Carolina, do hereby, in behalf of them-
selves and of the People whom they represent, solemnly protest against the order of the House of 
Representatives, laying upon the Table tbe following Resolntion: 
Resolved, That it is expedient that this L egislature should diminish as far as pofSible the public 
debt of the State; that no 'occa.sion exi~ts for further sale of State Stock, under the Act for 
rebuilding the City of Charleston; and that the President and Directors of the Bank of the State 
are hereby required to deliver up to the Comptroller General, to be cancelled, all certificates of 
Stock or other obligations in their possession, issued under the said Act, which remain unsold. 
And these Protestants, considering the said order as equivalent to a rejection of the Resolution, 
beg leave respectfully tu enter their solemn protest ago.inst such rejection, for' the following 
amon12: other reasons: 
1. l3ecause a public debt is a great public evil, and ought to be incurred only in cases of great 
and urgent necessity. . 
15 
2. Beca.use the public debt incurred to rebuild the City of Charleston was created to repair one 
<>f the greatest calamities which the State had ever suffered ; and even under so pressing a necessity, 
was only permitted upon the express guarantee of the City of Charleston against all loss to the State. 
3. Because the President and Directors of the Bank of the State, having been appointed the 
agents of the State to sell the public bonds which might he required to raise money to rebuild the 
City of Charleston, have already sold $626,636 more than is required for the sufferers by the fire, 
and now propose to sell $332,795 more ; thereby increasing the public debt one million of dollars 
beyond what was required to rebuild the City of Charleston. 
4. Because the public debt of about one million of dollars, which has been applied to rebuild the 
City of Charleston, charges the State only with an interest of 5 per cent., and is secured, 1st. By the 
individual bonds of the borrowers; 2d. By a Mortgage of each Town lot with the houses thereon, 
covered by a policy of Insurance; and 3d. By the guarantee of the City of Charleston. Whereas 
the debt which the Resolution proposes to reduce, charges the State with an interest of six per cent., 
and is to be loaned out to indi:viduals, subject to all the hazards of banking operations. 
5. Because the borrowing of money on the public credit to lend out to individuals, whether by 
means of a Bank, or otherwise, is a policy dangerous to the best interests of the State, and contrary 
to the principles of Republican Government. 
6. Because the property of e\<ery citizen of the country becomes pledged to pay the public debt; 
and when money raised by means of such debt, is leaned out to individuals, every citizen of the 
State is virtually made the endorser of the notes of the favored few to whom the money is loaned. 
7. Because the Bank of the State, when first established, was based upon funds which the State 
had acquired as actual capital, tloe loss upon which, through banking operations, could only affect 
such capital, without injury to the public treasury ; but the new policy now proposed, of raising 
money for the Bank by increasing the public debt, involves the State Treasury in all the casualties 
and dangers of banking operations, &nd is subversive of that great principle avowed by the State, of 
keeping the Public Treasury independent of Banks. 
8. Because the great facility with which money can be raised upon the public credit, has a 
tendency to seduce the public servants from their duty, and to confer upon those who lend out the· 
money a secret and dangerous control over the councils of the State. 
9. Because the experience of the Bank of the State has proved, that its profits have been dimin-
ished as its capital has been increa..sed; that for the last four years, even without reserving any fund 
to meet future losses, its average of profit bas been only 5 % per cent. ; that the proposition there-
fore, that the State should borrow money at 6 per cent., to lend out at 5 ~, subject also to the usual 
casualties of banking, cannot fail to result in loss, which must eventually be made good by taxing 
the people. 
C. G. Memminger, 
Z. P. Herndon, 
J, fl.Adams, 
Otis Mills, 
A. G. Magrath, 
James M. Walke~, 
Geo. Anderson, 
J, D. Wilson, 
J, W.Jones, 
J, A. Alston, 
F. W. Davie, 
John Schnierle, 
Henry J. Smith, 
Robt. S. Allison, 
Henry Smith, 
Paul Quattlebaum, 
H. H. Thomson, 
Thomas H. Pop~, 
], Sheppard, 
Henry Gonrdin, 
Allard H. Belin, 
Edward Frost, 
Wm. T. Ellerbe, 
Wade S. Cothran, 




Jas. Chesnut, Jr., 
C. W. Dudley, 
J. Washington Rice, 
Sam'!. Jackson, 
Daniel Y. Jenkins, 
S. M.Earle, 
B. S. Massey, 
T. Edwin Ware, 
J. Wingard, 
The refusal of the Bank to cancel these Bonds of the State, under these 
'Circumstances, and the still more unjustifiable refusal to permit so large a body 
of the Representatives of the people to exhibit and record their reasons, speak 
a language which cannot be misunderstood. They demonstrate the disastrous 
influences which the Bank has exercised upon the public councils ; and establish 
beyond a doubt how completely the public authorities are swerved from the 
true path of duty :wherever this Bank is concerned. 
But it is not only in its influence upon the public authorities that the 
experience and history of the Bank exhibits its injurious action ; its OWiI 
doings, within its own sphere of action, fur~ish the most conclusive evidence. 
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'Take the single operation in Charleston Bank Stock. In that great bubble• 
where 92 millions of dollars were subscribed by a community run mad, to raise 
a Bank Capital of two millions, the Bank of the State was among the foremost 
of the speculators. Without consulting the Legislature, the Board of Directors 
subscribe more than their whole capital to another Bank, in which the public 
authorities never conceived the possibility of placing their funds ; and ever 
since the Bank of Charleston has been in existence, the State has been in fact 
one of its largest Stockholders, and is even now involved in the hazards of tho 
operations of that Bank. 
The same thing is true of the two Georgia Railroads-of the Nesbit Manu-
facturing Company, the Limestone Springs, and all those loans to incorporated 
Companies, which are among the most hazardous and long protracted of the 
debts of the Bank. 
The history of the Bank exhibits another feature which cannot be disguised. 
The Directors of the Bank exhibit a solid mass of liability, amounting to 
upwards of seven hundred thousand dollars; and if to this be added the 
liabilities of the Officers of the Bank, it results that those conducting the affairs 
of the Bank have taken to their own use three-fourths of the whole actual capi-
tal of the Bank. What a commentary upon what is called the People's Bank! 
Then let there be added to this the fact that the Bank has already lost, 
through its Directors, upwards of four hundred thousand dollars, and all the 
outlines of the picture are filled out. It makes apparent that the true name of 
the subject is not the People's Bank. It is the Directors' Bank! 
But I will not pursue this branch of the subject any further. Enough has 
been said to establish all the propositions for which we contend, and to demon-
strate the evils attendant upon the continuance of the Bank of the State. 
It merely remains to disp@se of some of the objections which are urged 
against any interference with the Bank. 
OBJECTIONS. 
1. The first and most prominent of these objections is, that the Bank is 
pledged to our Foreign Creditors, and that we are bound to continue its exist-
ence until the period at which the debt is payable. 
If this argument bold good, it would furnish an instance of one of the most 
flagrant frauds ever perpetrated upon the people ; and the very fact that it is 
gravely urged by the friends of the Bank, shows the shifts to which they are 
willing to resort to sustain the continuance of the Bank. The amount of the 
argument is this: The Bank's existence terminates by the law of its charter 
in 1856. By an Act or'the Legislature, the Governor was authorized to issue 
State Bonds, payable in 1870, and the Rank was to provide an agent to sell 
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tho Bonds, and to make arrangements for paying the Interest and Principal, as 
it became payable. Now, for the Bank, by its own act or representation, to 
make ita existence, which the law terminated in 1856, extend to 1870, was 
allowing them to extend their own char~er without law, and even in fraud of 
the· law. No one ever imagined before, that a mere undertaking to provide 
for a debt ten years hence, implied an obligation that the person who~e assets 
were bound by the debt should live .to pay it. His Executor or Adminis-
trator would be bound to apply the assets, and could as well do so as the 
original party. And just so could the assets of a Bank be applied by the 
Trustees who would wind up its affairs, without any necessity to resort to a 
trap upon the Legislature who authorized the debt, and to insist that they have 
undertaken to bind their successors beforehand to recharter the Bank. 
But the argument in fact has no basis in truth. The Act for rebuilding the 
City of Charleston, which authorized the issue of these State Bonds, when 
examined, will be found to contain the following undertakings in relation to 
the debt to be contracted: 
1. By the 1st Section, "the faith and funds of the State are pledged to 
secure the punctual payment of the said Bonds' or contracts, with the interest 
thereon." 
2. By the 10th Section, it is made the duty of the President and Directors 
of the Bank to make proper provision for the punctual p;yment of the interest, 
and for the ultimate payment of the principal. 
3. By the 11th Section, the President and Directors are required to keep 
an account of the profits to arise from this Loan ; and these profits are pledged 
for the payment of the interest and principal of the Loan. 
4. By the 12th Section it is provided, that when the profits of the Bank 
shall have paid the public debt, both principal and interest, for which they are 
already pledged, the said profits shall also .\ie ?onsidered pledged for payment 
of tho interest and principal of said Loan. 
Now, in all these pledges, so far as £bey relate to the Bank, they are entirely 
confined to its profits. These are distinctly pledged, and so are the faith and 
funds of the State. The pledge then embraces these two subjects, a~d these 
only. The faith and funds of the State embrace all its resources, as well those 
in the Bank as those in the Railroad Company and the Bank of Charleston; 
and an argument might as well be predicated in behalf of the charters of these 
Institutions as of the Bank of the State. And if these pledges operate to 
prevent the State from changing its money investments, then the State bas 
already broken b~r faith at this very Session, in transferring to the new Railroad 
Companies the money she owned in the South Carolina Railroad Company. 
And yet the friends of the Bank saw no difficulties there. 
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The other subject of the pledge offers even less real difficulty. The pledge 
made is of the profits of the Bank. What are these ? The money which the 
Bank will make during the period of its existence. Could any one mistake 
what this meant, when the duration of its existence was before them in the 
Statute Book? Will gentlemen say, that General McDuffie concealed from the 
persons with whom he was dealing that the Bank Charter expired in 1856 'l 
and when they were taking a pledge of the profits of the Bank, do gentlemen 
propose to persuade us that the English Creditor never inquired how long 
these profits were to continue? As well might they und.ertake to persuade us 
that a creditor, to whom a leasehold estate was offered by way of mortgage, 
would not inquire how long the lease had to run. 
The whole difficulty will vanish by merely changing the phrase. Suppose 
a Company engaged in a partnership, which by articles was to continue for 
five years, should pledge the profits to arise from the partnership as security 
to pay a debt which was not due for ten years? Would any one cont~nd that 
this created an obligation to continue the partnership for ten years, or that 
any thing more than the profits for five years was pledged? When the part-
nership should expire, then provision would have to be made to secure the 
assets of the partnership, with the profits accrued, for the benefit of the creditor. 
But not the smallest obligation would exist to continue the partnership. 
. So with the Bank; when the term of its charter expires, the State will be 
bound to preserve the profits then accrued, with a sufficient amount of the 
funds of the State, to secure the payment of the debt, principal and interest, 
as it becomes due. But there is not the slightest obligation to continue the 
charter of the B,ink, or to keep the funds in any form of investment which the 
State may not deem most beneficial 
But to insist, as the friends of the Bank do, that the ~unds shall be kept in 
an institution, which, by its own sh,owing, is not making the annual interest 
which has to be paid, while it puts at hazard the principal itself, seems to be 
taking a course as injurious to the creditor as to the State itself. The best 
thing a debtor can do for his creditor, is to pay bis debt; the next best, is to 
improve his means of payment. We propose to do either of these which the 
· creditor may prefer. The last thing to which we would consent would be in 
any manner to tarnish the honor of the State. 
2. The next objection which I shall notice is that we are destroying the. 
Bank of the Planters. 
I think it has already been shown that this is the Bank of the Directors, 
and certainly they are not the Planters. But it would be well to show the 
people of the State how completely fallacious is this ad captandum argument, 
and how few Planters are really accommodated by this Bank. If we knew the 
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number of the debtors of the Bank, we could arrive at certainty. But we can 
approximate results. Setting down the amount loaned the Directors and 
Officers of the Bank at $850,000, and the amount loaned the Commercial 
community at about the same, there would remain about $2,000,000 to be 
loaned Planters. Now, we have it in one of the Statements of the Bank, that 
of this last sum 88 debtors had out $592,556, making an average of $6,733 
each. Now, if the whole of the money loaned to Planters were loaned at an 
average as low as $5,000, it would only accommodate 400 Planters in the 
whole State. And if the average of loans were reduced down to as low a 
figure as $1,000, the whole number of Planters who would be accommodated, 
including the 88 above named, would amount to about 1488 at one time in 
the whole State, or about 50 to each District. A mighty figure, indeed, upon 
which to predicate the name of the People's Bank, or the Planters' Bank. 
3. But another objection most strenuously urged is, that this is not the 
proper time to commence any measures looking to the termination of the Bank, 
and that we ought to wait until the charter expires. 
The answer to this objection is, that the sooner measures are commenced, 
the greater can be the period of time over which they may be distributed, and 
the less likely to harass the debtors, or derange the business arrangements of 
the country. If the debts to be called in are distributed over the eight years 
of the charter which remain, only instalments of one-eighth need be called in. 
upon good debts, and the measure would be one of relief, instead of pressure. 
The business arrangements of the country would easily accommodate themselves 
to this gradual and gentle change, and no one would suffer. So, too, in any 
difficulties that may arise, time could be extended according to circumstances, 
and the State would sooner be relieved from all the evils to which the Bank 
exposes her. Neither would there exist any difficulty in providing for the 
public debt. The interest of the Loans made by the Bank would be received 
in time to pay the interest of the public debt, and the principal would be called 
in in ample time to meet the principal. Even should it be found impracti-
cable to buy up the State Bonds, there would be no difficulty in securely 
investing the funds of the State, until the debt becomes payable. 
But there is one consideration which seems to demonstrate the necessity of 
acting upon this subject before the expiratio1c1 of the charter of the Bank. 
By a strange coincidence, it happens that the charters of six of the Banks of 
this State expire about tM same time, and may come up before the same 
Legislature for renewal. These are the Banks of the largest capital, and 
seeing ( as we now do) the influence which the Bank of the State alone has 
exhibited, we may imagine what will be the combined influence of this 
tremendous money power. It is not hazarding mu,)h to say, that if the 
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Legislature does not take the part of wisdom by dividing this influence, and 
taking matters in advance, the combination will be too strong to be resisted. 
We shall be placed in a situation in which it may be more ruinous to refuse 
than to grant a renewal. By acting now, we detach the Bank of the State, 
the most formidable; and we can then act with the others as the public interest 
may require. 
Upon the whole, then, my best judgment is, that now is the time for action. 
The question is before us, brought up regularly by His Excellency the 
Governor. It can be disposed of now, with comparative ease and quietness. 
Let us ~eet the emergency and act now. We need do nothing more than 
commence; our measures may follow as gently and as gradually as the public 
interests may require. There need be no pressure either upon the debtors 
or upon the public; and the great recommendation of commencing at once to 
put :the Bank in a state of liquidation, is that you extend the time during which 
its affairs may be adjusted. 
Mr. Chairman, I have done. I have endeavored to place before the Com-
mittee the reasons which ought to decide the people of the State to put an end 
to this Bank. I'have discussed the question entirely as one of State policy, 
and have avoided all personal issues. I trust this example will be followed, 
and that the decision will be made upon considerations of reason, and not of 
feeling. I have discharged my duty in bearing testimony to the injurious and 
demoralizing tendency of the Institution, and in urging upon the oountry the 
necessity of terminating its existence. 
REPLY OF 
MR. C. G. MEMMINGER, 
TO THE VARIO US SPEAKERS 
ON THE 
Q.UESTION OF THE PROPRIETY OF 
RECHARTERING THE BANK OF THE STATE. 
MR. CHAIRMAN : At the commencement of this discussion I endeavored to 
divest it of all personal character, and studiously avoided every thing which 
might excite prejudice or give rise to personal collisions. I even strove to say 
as little as was possible as to the manner in which the Bank was managed, and 
placed the question of recharter upon the broad ground of public policy. It 
was not that I had any fears as to the result of an inquiry into the conduct of 
the Bank, or of those who are opposed to it; but because I desired to avoid 
all collateral i3sues, and to tread as gently as might be possible upon the feel-
ings of those who may be personally involved in the fate of the Bank. But 
the friends of the Bank, instead of following in this line of open and kindly 
discussion, have left the questions at issue, and have assailed mo personally in 
such a manner that an indifferent observer might suppose that it were I, instead 
of the Bank, who stood at the bar of the House for trial. So far as these 
assaults concern me personally, they are matters of profound indifference, 
Truth and integrity are like the ocean near which I am accustomed to reside. 
The winds may strive to disturb its serenity, but the deep waters below lie 
calm and tranquil; and the agitation upon the surface serves but to purify, by 
casting from its bosom the foreign scum with which its pure waters refuse to 
mingle. 
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But while I will not condescend to notice any of these attempts to affect 
me personally, I cannot with propriety pass by tho efforts made by the friends 
of the Bank to prejudice the judgment of the House, by asserting that I had 
underrated its intelligence, or assumed to direct its action. It has been roundly 
asserted that I had argued that the members of the Legislature were incapa-
ble of understanding the concerns of the Bank, and so must deliver up their 
judgments to those who better understood these matters. Such an assertion 
is an entire perversion of fact. My argument was that tbe affairs of the 
.Bank, and its·statements and accounts, were so complicated, that few of the 
members of the House, and still fewer of the people, were familiar with them; 
a.nd that this complexity rendered the Bank an unfit machine for a Republican 
Government. Surely any one can perceive the wide difference batwecn a want 
of information on a given subject, and an incapacity to understand it. It was 
but a day or two since, that proposals from the printers of the House were 
read to us offering to print at so much for ems and so much in pica. Did any 
one consider it an imputation upon him that he did not know what ems and 
pi.ca meant? Or if I were now to assert that the planters in this House, and 
perhaps some of the lawyers, do not know what is meant by a capias irv wither. 
nam, would that be an imputation upon their intelligence ? But to affirm 
that they were . incapable of ascertaining or understanding t~ese matters, after 
a due examination into them, would be quite another matter. 
So, too, it has been attempted to excite prejudice, by holding me up individ-
ually as leading the deliberations of the House. If at any time the House 
has chanced to take the course which I have advised, it is because that course 
coin0ided with its own judgment. I have no machinery with which to affect 
its action but truth and reason, and that single hearted desire for the public 
good, which influence every right.minded public servant If any one shall have 
the hardihood to suppose that he can lead the Legislature of South Carolina 
by any other influence than that of reason and argument, let him make the 
experiment; and he will find himself tossed aside like the bubble which should 
attempt to hold' back the winds. He who leads in a body like this is but the 
first line of the column of advance. So long as he continues to move in con-
formity with the wish of the whole mass, he maintains his post; but if he falter 
or turn ·aside, the rest will go forward to its purpose, equally regardless of his 
presence or his absence. 
I will add but one further remark, as to these extraneous considerations, 
which have been made so prominent by the friends of the Bank. They evince 
a consciousness of the weakness of their cause . . It is a well known rule in 
this kind of polemics, to endeavor either to change the issue, or to make your 
opponent angry, when you find yourself unable to maintain the contest. Both 
• 
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these attempts, however, will here prove unsuccessful. The advocates of the 
Bank will find themselves equally unable to ruffle our serenity, or to induce us 
to take up a false issue. We intend to bring them back from the mazes into 
which for the last week they have been endeavoring to lead astray the House, 
and to hold up their arguments in the clear sunlight of truth. It may take 
some time to remove the :fil_aments with which they have surrounded the sub-
ject; but that time will be well spent, if it shall enable the people of South 
Carolina to see with clearness their real interest in this matter. 
I have endeavored carefully to analyze the views presented by all the gentle-
men who have spoken on the other side; and everything which has been urged 
by them, when reduced to order, will be found (I think) to be contained in 
one or other of the following propositions: 
I. That the Bank is not unconstitutional. 
2. That the principle of separation between Bank and State applies to the 
Federal, but not to the State Government. 
3. That it is a mistake to suppose that the Bank of the State exercises or 
has exercised any undue influence over the counsels of South Carolina. 
4 . That the argument derived from the experience of other States is falla-
cious 
5. That the Bank of the State has been a faithful and profitable agent, and 
is now in· a better condition for effecting the objects for which it was created 
than it ever has been before. 
6. That the faith of the State is pledged to the Foreign Creditor to rechar-
ter the Bank. 
7. That it will produM great distress to the debtors of the Bank, and much 
difficulty to the public, in providing for the public debt, if the Bank be not 
rechartered. 
These propositions are set down in order, not because they contain matter of 
equal importance, but because I desire to show that not a single position in 
favor of the Bank is overlooked, or treated with a want of candor and fairness. 
While, therefore, I will give to each its due share of con.sideration, I am able 
to assure the House that some of them can be disposed· of at much less cost 
of time than will be devoted to others. 
1. First, then, as to the constitutionality of the Bank. 
The argument which was advanced by me in the opening of this debate was 
that the Bank is at variance with the spirii of the constitution. I was well 
aware that the Courts had decided that, according to the letter of the constitu-
tion, they could not pronounce against the Bar.'.:. But the reasoning on which 
that decision is founded has never been deemed satisfactory; and were the 
question au_ open one now, I hazard the assertion that the decision would 
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scarcely be the same. Indeed, it is well known to the profession, that the most 
eminent jurists are opposed to this decision; and that the Supreme Court ~f the 
United States had actually come to the decision tbat such a Bank is unconsti-
tutional; and nothing but the death of one of the judges, before the judgment 
was pronounced, prevented the overthrow of all such Banks through?ut the 
Union. 
But the argument which we advance, independent of all this, is, that the 
Bank of the State is opposed to the spirit of our own State Constitution. We 
are not speaking of forms and technicalities, but of substantial things. Judi-
cial tribunals are bound to take things in the external form which the Legisla-
ture chooses to give them. They are hampered by a network which cannot 
entangle the Legislature. The people and their Representatives construe all 
constitutions according to their substance-they care nothing for the shadow; 
it is the thing which they look after, and not the form Every one is familiar 
with the contrivance by which the Congress of the United States compelled 
the judicial tribunals to receive a tariff for the protection of manufactures as a 
constitutional law for raising revenue, merely by giving to it such a title. But 
such a contrivance is too flimsy to bind the common sense of the people; and 
consequently our State, with one voice, did not hesitate to pronounce the law 
unconstitutional; and they did so rightly, because it was in truth opposed to the 
substance and spirit of the constitution. 
Just so is it with this Bank. The judicial tribunals cannot find their way 
through the forms with which the Bank is surrounded. But when the Legis-
lature and the people are to look into the matter, forms cannot blind them, 
neither can all the network with which the Bank may be surrounded serve to 
entangle them. When the constitution provides that the legislative authority 
shall be exercised by the Senate and House of Representatives in open assem-
bly, and that nothing shall have the force of law in South Carolina until a bill 
enacting it shall have been read on three separate days in the Senate and on 
three separate days in the House of Representatives; when each House is 
required to keep a journal, and to enter the names of those who vote for, and 
those who vote against, a measure, so that the people may be fully informed as. 
to the action of their Representatives, are we to be told that it is no violation 
of the spirit of this constitution to permit many of the most important acts 
of legislation to be exercised by a President and twelve Bank Directors, 
sitting in profound secrecy, not only with doors closed, but with their very 
mouths sealed by an oath of secrecy which they are required to take? And 
these thirteen men may consummate in half an hour, with or without reason, 




Again. When the constitution, considering the taxing power as the great 
right arm of constitutional ' liberty, expressly retains that power in the rands 
of the House of Representatives, as the more immediate and responsible ser-
vants of the people, and is so jealous of this right, as even to preve:1t the 
Senate of the State from originating a bill to raise taxes, is it not A VIOLATION 
OF T~E SPIRIT OF THIS CONSTITUTION to allow a board of thirteen men, sitting 
in secret, and acting under an oath of secrecy-not responsible to the people, 
and actually unknown to them-to involve the State in debt:at their pleasure to 
seven millions of dollars, and thus virtually to exercise at their pleasure not 
only a power to tax the people, but actually to tax them for years and years in 
advance, and thus to impose an obligation which not even the whole legislative 
power of the State is able to remove or modify ! 
And, again. When the Constitution most cautiously provides that no money 
shall be drawn from the Public Treasury but by a Bill, to be read three times 
in the House, and three times in the Senate, on three separate days, subject to 
the same public discussion, and to the same publication of Yeas and Nays for 
the information of the people IS IT NO VIOLATION OF THE SPIRIT OF THIS CON-
STITUTION that thirteen men, sitting in secrecy, and protected by a mut1;al oath 
of secrecy, should have power given them to vote away at their pleasure millions 
of money, bo~rowed on the public credit-public money-either for Railroads, 
or to be employed in speculations in Bank Stock, or to be parcelled out among 
themselves and their friends, at the rate of eight hundred thousand dollars 
among the Bank Directors alone? 
Finally. When the Constitution guards the public money with so much 
caution, as to require that the Treasnrers who are appointed to keep it shall 
remain in office only for four years, and shall then not be re-eligible, thus 
insuring a speedy examination and closing of accounts; is it no violation of 
the spirit of _this constitution to permit the President and other Officers of 
the Bank, who have in their keeping ten times as much public money as both 
the Treasurers together-to permit these Bank Officers, I say, to remain in 
office for a whole lifetime, without any resort to that check which a rotation in 
office was intended by the Constitution to provide ? 
2. Let us now proceed to the next p~oposition maintained by the advocates 
of.the Bank, and see if it has any better foundation. They maintain that the 
separation of Bank and State, although proper for the Federal Government, is 
not applicable in principle to the State. 
Let us ascertain then the principle upon which our State, with such remark-
able unanimity, condemned the connection between Bank and State in the 
Federal Government. It must be remembered, that the Resolutions adopted 
by our State Legislature wei;e levelled, not against the United States Bank, 
.. 
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but again~t the State Banks. The public moneys had been withdrawn from 
the United States Bank, and were then in the hands of what were called the 
Pet Banks. It was not therefore from apprehension of the enormous power 
and patronage of the United States Bank; but it was because the public 
moneys were involved in the r.asualties of banking. The State Banks made 
discounts and disbursements upon the public moneys deposited with them. In 
fact, the public moneys were virtually removed from the hands of the public 
officers constituted by law, and were placed under the control of Bank 
Directors. As might be expected, these moneys were loaned out, and not 
only could not be bad by the Government when wanted, but were exposed to 
all the casualties of banking operations. 
Is not this pre-eminently the case with the State of South Carolina, in its 
connection with the Bank of the State? The Pet Banks had only the actual 
moneys of the General Government. But the Bank of the State not only has 
in its hands all the public moneys, but inasmuch as the State is liable for all 
the debts of the Bank, including its circulation and deposites, it is obvious that 
the State is actually a partner in all its concerns, and guaranties every contract • 
entered into by the Bank. Under the arrangement between· the General 
Government and the Banks, the only loss which could ensue to the Govern-
ment would be of the money actually on hand-the Government incurred no • 
liability for the Bank. But in South Carolina, the people of the State are 
liable for every debt of the Bank! and are thus in fact endorsers of every loan 
or speculation in which the Bank may engage. 
Nay, the matter is even still worse than this. The greater part of the capital 
on which the Bank of the State operates is borrowed money-money borrowed 
on the faith of the State. Now, it is plain that if any part of this money be 
lost in the operations of the Bank, it must be paid by taxing the people. The 
State is therefore as effectually involved in the hazards of banking, as though 
it carried on the business itself. And so completely has the Bank absorbed 
the State and all its resources within its vortex, that the very fund which bas 
been raised and set apart as a Sinking Fund, to pay the public debt as it 
matures, bas been placed in the bands of the Bank, and is actually used in its 
banking operations. Whatever casualty therefore befalls the Bank, disables it 
from having this fund forthcoming, and places the faith of tho State at the 
hazard of every commercial revulsion. So far then from its being true that 
the reasons for the separation of Bank and State do not apply to the State 
Government, directly the reverse is true; and the reasons for the separation 
are far more cogent and convincing. 
3. But next it is insisted that we are mistaken in supposing that the Bank 
of the State exercises, or has exercised, any undue influence over the counsels 
of the State. 
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The friends of the Bank must count largely upon the credulity of the public 
when they deny that it exercises influence over the public counsels. At this 
very moment, while I am speaking, who does not feel that it is operating in this 
very Hall? Are not its officers and partisans seen in every direction busy 
among the members, taking them hy the button, or whispering in their ear 
words of promise or of threatening? And do we not feel that this influence meets 
us at every step? I would like to know. what chance one standing up against 
them, and bearding them as I am now doing, would have to get a discount, in 
comparison with the accepted champion of the other side; or how one who is 
within their power as a debtor, would dare to encounter that power by open 
conflict? 
Gentlemen on the other side endeavor to parry the effect of these argument~. 
by urging that none of the influences of which we speak are chargeable 'upon 
the Bank itself; they are merely the acts of its friends. True, we do not 
assert that the soulless corporation can act from the impulse of passion-neither 
do we believe that a Board of Directors would have the folly to enter upon 
their Journals a formal Resolution that they had refused a discount, or enforced 
a debt, because the party concerned had dared to assail the Bank. Neither 
do we imagine, that, whe'.l lhe Bank and its supporters desired to plunge the 
State in debt for their benefit, they would in any public act a'\"OW their object 
or desire. That would of course be left to their friends to bring forward; and 
as to the punishment of their enemies, it would be after the fashion which Mr. 
Stephens so humorously describes in Yucatan. There the blessings of free 
suffrage are extended to all classes and all colors. When the day of election 
auives, the Zambos are marched off from the plantation to the polls, under the 
overseer, to exercise the elective franchise. The master of the plantation takes 
care, however, to distribute beforehand among them tickets with a private 
mark; an.d as the votes are counted, each private mark is sure to be noted, 
and an account taken of those missing. In the ensuing week something is 
sure to go wrong on the plantation, in the department of the honest Zambo 
whose ticket failed to be forthcoming, and he is severely punished-not for his 
failure to vote right; that wou· d be an invasion of the elective franchise. No I 
not at all; the punishment is altogether for his neglect of his plantation duties. 
Just so would it be with. the Bank, if I, or any of those who are opposing its 
continuance, should comi:i within its power, or ask for its accommodation. 
Certainly the high.minded, public spirited Bank Officers would not refuse the 
discount, or use its power to injure, because of that Speech which I am now 
making. No! not at all. But there would be something affecting the public 
good, or some defect in the endorser, or some other excellent reason, why the 
discount should not be granted. 
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Let any one that doqbts the influence of the Bank look to the history of the • 
State for the last ten or twenty years, and see if there be a single measure 
which the Bank has favored which has ever been known to fail. Or let him 
inquire when a person has been elected to any high office whom the Bank has 
thought it worth while to oppose. At this very moment it holds the strings 
of the State, and you may feel the contraction wherever the leader chooses to 
draw them. For ten years we have been trying to get a hearing from the 
people, and at every time when this Bank has been brought under discussion 
has it prevented a vote from being taken, by laying on the table every propo-
sition which would elicit light. And it will be seen even now, when we come 
to the vote, that the supporters of the Bank will use every device to prevent a 
direct vote from being taken upon the Resolutions now under discussion. 
4. But we proceed to consider the fourth proposition advanced on the other 
side, to wit : That the objections made to State Banks, drawn from the expe-
rience of other States, is fallacious. 
It is strange that gentlemen on the other side do not perceive that they 
themselves prove all that we contend for on this point. We insisted that for 
a State to engage in banking was unwise and impolitic; and as an additional 
proof of its inexpediency, we adduced the united experience of every State 
which bad tried the experiment. Gentlemen on the other side reply, that the 
failure in Kentucky arose from one cause-in Georgia from another-in North 
Carolina from a third-and in Alabama, they say it worked well for a time, 
until a wild system was adopted of giving discounts to each County. This 
reply admits the fact .of universal failure, which is all for which we contend. 
It matters nothing what was the cause. The result is in all cases the same-
absolute, universal failure of every scheme of State Banking. And what they 
themselves say of Alabama should warn them, that even if our banking should 
succeed for the time, as they say it does, still that does not secure us from 
falling into that gulf which has overwhelmed all other States which have made 
a similar experiment. 
5. Let us now proceed to the next ground upon which the advocates of the 
Bank have laid their main stress. They aver that the Bank has been a faith-
ful and profitable agent, and is now in a better condition for effecting the 
objects for which it was created than it ever has been, 
If the Bank be in this sound and prosperous condition, and has made the 
large sums of money which its friends assert for it, then it would be the part 
of wisdom to realize these funds, and no longer to keep the~ at hazard. All 
prudent men, when they have made a fortune in trade, retire the prize from 
the casualties of business, and invest it in some permanent security. Moreover, 
we have the testimony of His Excellency the Governor, and other distinguished ' 
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statesmen, that if the thing were to be done over, they would not favor the 
establishment of a Bank. Now, if the affairs of the Bank are so prosperous 
as its frienils represent, then the question is even less embarrassing than it was 
at first ; and we are authorized therefore to claim the Governor as being on 
our side, and advising that the institution should not be continued. 
But I am not disposed to take so grave a matter as proved by the mere 
assertion of the friends of the Bank. Let us examine for ourselves, and s.ee 
how it stands. The practical question before us is, shall the Bank be 
rechartered? That depends not upon the fact whether the Bank made money, 
or was in a sound condition some ten or twenty years ago; but what is its 
present condition, and what is likely to be its condition and business for the 
remaining years of its charter? We can ascertain in some degree its present 
condition from its returns, and we may approximate its future business by 
comparing the last ten years and striking an average. 
If we examine the returns made by the Bank itself, of the profits made upon 
the capital employed, we will find a great diminution in the last ten years. 
During the earliest period of the Bank's existence, when Mr. Elliott was 
President, the Bank made as much as 16 per cent. in a single year, and 
frequently over 10 per cent. But during the last nine years, from 1839 to 
1847, both inclusive, the average annual profits of the Bank, by its own showing, 
amount to 5 87-100 per cent. And if we exclude the year 1847, when for 
some reason they extended themselves, and accumulated a larger nominal 
profit, the average annual profit of the Bank upon the capital employed from 
1839 to 1846, inclusive, was only 5} per cent., while it actually was paying 6 
per cent. on all or most of its borrowed capital. These profits include also a 
large sum which the Bank received by charging itself with the State Bonds at 
par, and selling them out again from 8 to 12 per cent. advance. Let it be 
borne in mind, too, that these facts all appear from the statements made and 
published by the Bank itself. They are not our calculations or our figures. 
(See Bank Compilation, page 532.) • 
This diminution of profits is what might naturally have been expected, and 
was actually predicted, when in an evil hour the State was induced to borrow 
money for the Bank to bank upon. It is a well known financial fact, that only 
a certain amount of circulation can be kept out in a community. If that amount 
is assumed to be two millions, we can readily see that a Bank with one million 
of capital could issue another million of paper, and thus make a profit upon two 
millions, while actually employing only a million of actual capital. The profit 
of banking arises chiefly from the paper which can be issued beyond its capital. 
If the capital merely be loaned out at 6 per cent., the profits would be less 
than in other employments, inasmuch as all salaries, expenses and losses, must 
• 
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be paiJ out of this six per cent. When the Bank issues Bank Notes which 
bear no interest, and receives for them the notes of individuals bearing interest, 
all that interest is so much clear gain ; and it is obvious that the Bank, with a 
capital of one million, which can keep ont a million of its notes, will make twice 
as much nearly as the interest of its capital. But suppose the Bank to increase 
its capital by borrowing in England a million of dollars in coin, for which it is 
to pay 6 per cent. interest. It brings home that coin and lends it out;· and 
inasmuch as the community can only employ (by the supposition) two millions 
of dollars, the operation fills up the space which the Bank might have occupied 
with its paper, and thus gives back nothing but the interest which the Bank 
itself has to pay on the Loan, rnbject to abatement for salaries, expenses and 
losses. 
The great fire of Charleston occurred in April, 1838; and in that year the 
Fire Loan was effected. The money came home, and was added to the Bank 
capital in 1839. In that very year we find the Bank profits fallen to 5! per 
cent., and in 1840 to 4 18-100 per cent., while in 1838 it was 7 7-100 per 
cent., and in 1837, it was 9 30-100 per cent. 
It is for the same reason that the country Banks all over the State make 
larger profits than the Banks in Charleston. They have smaller capitals, and 
are able to keep out a larger circulation, and the result is seen in the dividends 
which they make. But the Bank of the State, from the very nature of its 
present capital, is bound to this chain-it must go on for the next ten years from 
bad to worse. It cannot, without undue extension, make the interest which it 
has to pay on its borrowed capital-neither can it realize for the State the 
legal interest on its actual capital. The inevitable result is, that for every year 
during which the Bank is continued, the State must sink from $5,000 to $20,-
000, according to circumstances. It is use1css to tell us the Bank once made 
money. That furnishes no reason why we should continue it now, when it annu-
ally loses us money. 
Let us inquire next, whether the other half of the assertion of the friends 
of the Bank, as to its present condition, stands upon any better foundation. 
The practical question is, what is the condition of the Bank now, and where is 
all this money which its friends affirm that it has made for the State? If they 
merely mean to affirm that in Mr. Elliott's time the Bank made money, and 
that that money is all spent, I make no issue with them. I do not deny that 
the Bank has made money in former times, before it fell into the hands of 
politicians and became a political machine, and before, to increase its power, its 
capital was increased by plunging the State into debt. The question is not as 
to the past, but as to the present. Assuredly, if the Bank is in so much better 
condition, as is affirmed by its friends, this improvement must appear in its 
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assets. '\Vhatever money it has for the benefit of the State, must be set forth 
in the annual statement which it renders to us of its condition. Let us take 
up the one rendered to us at the present session. By this statement it appears 
that it owes $5,812,026, and has assets to the amount of $5,912,026. By its 
own showing, therefore, all that it bas for the State, as the result of its opera-
tions up to the end of the y~ar, is $100,000, which it has carried to the credit 
of the Sinking Fund. This is the whole surplus beyond its liabilities, even 
assuming that every dollar of the assets is perfectly good. But is such a thing 
possible, as that so large an amoupt of assets shall be realized .without a corres-
ponding loss? The experience of most Banks is, that they lose an amount at 
least equal to what is called their suspended debt. Among the assets of this 
Bank, is set down $244,079 of suspended debt actually in suit, which has bP.en 
largely increased since the 1st October. It is most likely that at least this 
amount of tbeassets will be lost; for although some of it may be good, yet at 
least an equal amount of the rest will prove bad, so that the loss on this score may 
fairly be set down at $300,000. How much more of the general assets must 
be set down as bad, it is impossible to conjecture; but fact~ which have trans-
pired darkly in relation to family loans, and incorpo.rated companies, make it 
probable that the loss from these quarters must be great. I do not propose, 
however, to take into the account such conjectural items. 
The statement of the Bank gives us the large item of $434!653 invested in 
Stocks, on most of which there certainly must be a loss. Then the Banking 
Houses are set down at $67,147, when they will scarcely realize one-half of 
that sum; and the Real Estate owned by the Bank at $38,960. •Setting down 
the whole losses on all these assets at the sum of $400,000, and deducting from 
that the·$100,000 of surplus above referred to, we have a result that the Bank, 
as it now stands, bas sunk about $300,000, or nearly one-third of the whole 
actual capital put in by the State. And if it is to be continued upon the same 
footing until 1856, at the annual loss above shown to have occurred for the 
last ten years, it will probably sink one-sixth of what remains. 
Nothing could more completely prove that something is radically unsound, 
than the fact exhibited by the Bank's last annual statement, that they have 
been obliged to borrow $140,000 to meet their liabilities. It appears that this 
sum has since been increased to $:226,000, and that the Bank has actually 
paid more than at the rate of. 1:2 per cent. for the accommodation. If any of 
us were dealing with a person who bad been in the ba'bit of lending money at 6 
per cent. and learned that this person was porrowing money at the rate of 12 
per cent. it would be difficult to persuade us of the soundness of his condition. 
Certainly this single fact would outweigh every array of figures which he might 
bring together in a statement of his assets. 
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It has been said in defe-oce of the Bank, that it preferred submitting to this 
loss rather than distress its debtors by calling upon them. If so, it proves 
beyond controversy that the assets of the Bank must be of a most doubtful 
character, when out of a discount line of nearly three millions and a half of 
dollars, and Stocks to the amount of $434,000, they could not raise the small 
sum of $140,000 to meet its current business. 
If there be one duty more obligatory than another upon the State, it is to 
keep a sound and stable currency. The Bank of the State ought therefore, in 
this· aspect of the question, to present the very best condition of things, and to 
set the other Banks an example worthy to be followed. The issues of a Bank 
furnish the currency, and upon their immediate convertibility depend the whole 
business arrangements of the country. Every Bank, therefore, is bound to keep 
on band such an amount of Specie, and of other assets immediately available, 
as will meet the demands which may immediately be made upon the Bank. 
Now, the Bank of the State shows by its statement that it bas out a circulation 
of $772,215, and has on hand only $94,624 in Specie. And if all the imme-
diate liabilities of the Bank are added together, they amount to ••• $1,463,839 
While their assets immediately available are only ••••••••• , • • • • 182,244 
What a condition for a Specie-paying Bank I A Bank of the State! A 
Bank of such a State as South Carolina! If this be the condition of which 
the friends of the Bank boast, truly may we be at a loss to find their standard 
of Bank solvency ! Vain must be every attempt on the part of the State to 
require other Banks to enlarge their specie basis, when the State's own Bank 
is thus deficietft. It is doubtless upon this consideration, that many of the 
other Banks have ventured to let their specie run so low, as even to hazard a 
renewal of the ca_lamities arising from a suspension of specie payments. 
Pressed by these difficulties, gentlemen on the other side have sought to 
cover the Bank under the authority of former reports of the Committee of 
Ways and Means. They have ransacked the records of the House, and have 
brought forward a Report made in the year 1838, while I bad the honor to be 
Chairman of this Committee, containing an incidental remark that the Bank of 
the State might then safely have increased its issues to two millions of dollars. 
They argue from this that its issues are undoubtedly not too large now. The 
argument proves but too clearly, the straits to which the Bank advocates are 
reduced. In 1838, when that report was written, the Bank had on hand 
$587,051 of Specie l!'unds. They bad negotiated a Loan of one million of 
dollars on the State Bonds in England, and expected to receive the money in 
the following year. Could anything be clearer than that, with cash assets of 
$1,587,000, they could safely redeem a circulation of $2,000,000? And does 
that prove that, with cash assets now not exceeding $182,000, they are safe in 
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having out a circulation of $772,0001 with other immediate liabilities, which 
swell the amount to $1,463,839. As well might a merchant who, with $10,000 
in hand, was advised that he might issue his notes for $15,000, claim that the 
same advice warranted him in issuing for $10,000, when he had spent all the 
money he had. 
But it is said that if all this be true, why did not the Committee of Ways 
and l\Ieans and its Chairman sound the alarm, and awaken the State to the 
danger upon which it was slumbering? And answering the question for them-
selves, gentlemen on the other side go on and draw the inference, that inasmuch 
as no such alarm was sounded ; as the Committee was, as they suppose, silent, 
all that is now said must be regarded as sudden and new light, and therefore 
fanciful and untrue. I understand fully the drift of the argument. It is in-
tended by innuendo to dissipate the force of all that I may have said, and 
through the Committee to aim at its Chairman another of those weapons which 
the Bank has been accustomed to direct. But the instrument has been badly 
chosen, and still worse directed; for it will presently appear that it was unsound 
at the breech, and all the mischief has recoiled upon its own Directors. 
In the year 1839, I had for the first time an opportunity of learning some-
thing with certainty about this Bank, having then been appointed one of the 
Investigating Committee for that period. The result of that investigation is . 
embodied in a report, which, although I had something to do with making it, I 
will venture to say, has given the public more information as to the action of 
the Bank than was given them before. Gentlemen on the other side, have 
selected from this report a single sentence, in which the assets of the Bank are 
generally spoken of with approbation, and have thereupon assumed that the 
report was a recommendation of the Bank. They have shut.their eyes to the 
grave specifications of mismanagement which are set forth in the report, and in 
the ten Resolutions with which the report concludes. The character both of 
the Report and Resolutions may be understood by referring to a single item 
of these specifications, which is thus set forth in the document : 
· Bank ef Charleston Stock.-The number of Shares now held by the Bank, is the residue of an 
original subscription. 'l'he Bank h:1ving subscribed for 18,000 shares, $1,800,000, obtained under 
the apportionment of shares subsequently made by the Commissioners 1,786 shares, for which it paid 
$178,600. Of the number so obtained, eight hundred were so'ld at an advance of $43, producing a 
profit of $34,000 on the number sold. The remaining 986 shares represented on the books of the 
Bank as $98,600, which, with two subsequent payments on the new Stock, amounting to $49,500, 
constitutes the sum total of the Stock held in th:,t Bank, and is as represented in the Exhibit. 
Your Committee would b:,rely remark in reference to this transaction, th:,t although the Bank 
incurred but little hszard of loss by this extraordinary measure, yet, in a public and moral view, it 
presents singular and most striking features. The State had already pledged the whole capital of 
the Bank, with all its future profits, to the payment of its own debt. Yet the officers who conducted 
the Bank, on a mere speculation, the issues of which, like all other speculations, was for a time doubt-
ful, pledged anew, not only the whole capital of the Bank, but $740,000 more; an amount which cov-
<ired not the capital only, but the whole amount 'of the Sinking Fund. If under such circumstances 
the Bank could have maintained its claim in a Court of Law to an apportionment of shares, it is 
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nevertheless a most dangerous and alarming precedent; against the recnITenee of which, it is the es-
pecial duty of the Legislature to guard. The question in the abstract-Have the President and 
Directors a power to pledge the Capital and the Sinking Fund of the Bunk, to any object incompati-
ble with the legislative will and plighted faith. ~f the State 1 can admit of but one answer; and if 
they cannot, have they a right to the profit arismg from a pledge thns made 1 
At the conclusion of the Report is a series of Resolutions, recommended for 
the adoption of the Legislature, one of which is as follows: 
Resolved, That any traffic by Banks in Stock, or any speculation by them in the property or 
produce of the country, is prejudicial to its welfare, and detrimental to the public morals; and that 
the Bank is hereby enjoined not to deal or trade in any Stock, otherwise than in the mere purcha.se 
of Stock of this State, for the purpose of redemption or investment, or where Stock may be received 
in commutation of debts heretofore incurred. 
The estimate set by the Bank and its supporters upon this Report, is best 
illustrated by the reception which they gave to it. In the Senate it was mot 
by loud and clamorous opposition. But in the House, where I stood forward 
as responsible for its assertions, I was not permilted even to open its evidence. 
A motion which shut out all debate was made to lay the Report and Reso-
lutions on the table, and this motion was adopted by a large majority. Thus 
was effectually silenced at this period the voice of all opposition. I remember 
to have had much material for public information-many facts highly inter-
esting to show the character of the Bank. One of these I well remember yet, 
it was, that one family had among them one-ninth of the capital of the Bank, 
and that the Bank might have then been designated as a Family Bank. 
Whether it has since changed in this relation, I am not informed. The returns 
now made, show that it has certainly at least assumed the character of a Direct-
ors', if not a Family Bank. 
Such was the fate. of the first development I had the honor to make in 
relation to the affairs of the Bank. Let gentlemen now say whether there was 
failure on our part to sound an alarm, or to point out the errors of the Bank. 
During the existence of the next ensuing General Assembly, in the year 
1841, I have already exhibited the effort we made to cancel the Fire Loan 
Bonds, and to reduce the borrowed capital of the Bank. The furious struggle 
which the Bank made to hold them bas been already developed. Again did 
they succeed in laying upon the table our motion; and they were able to per-
suade a majority of this House to refuse us even the poor privilege of entering 
our Protest on the Journal. 
Thtl next General Assembly brought us help from a high quarter. The 
Governor brought the Bank before the c<rnntry in terms which compelled their 
respectful attention; and now we find them most courteously proposing them-
selves to cancel the small amount of Fire Loan Bonds which they bad been 
unable as yet to sell. Moreover, they met the requi~itions of the Committee 
of Ways and Means to call in, during the next two years, $500,000 of the 
State Lial>ilities, and reduce so much of the borrowed capital; and they were 
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permitted to assume to themselves the honor of the initiative. It was accord-
ingly agreed that the Act of 1843 should be passed, entitled an Act to reduce 
the Public Debt. I for one rejoiced that there was now a prospect of relieving 
the State of the burden which had been fastened upon her, and in this pros-
pect the period of this General Assembly passed by without further conflict. 
The time required for carrying out the Act of 1843 was allowed to pass by, 
and we waited patiently to see its fruits in the reduction of the public liabilities. 
We reached the year 1846, when the Bank's statements disclosed the fact, 
' that although they had cancelled about $500,000 of the public debt, yet at 
the same time they bad issued Bank Notes to a large amount. So that while 
the public had been relieved from a liability to pay Bonds payable in 20 years, 
they were saddled with another liability to pay an equal amount of Notes 
payable ou demand. So far therefore from gaining the advantages proposed 
by the Act of 1843, the Bank bad altogether failed to perform its engagements, 
and the country was worse off than before that Act. This state of things was 
brought to the view of the Legislature, in a Report made by the Committee of 
Ways and Means in 1846 ; which recommended the adoption of the following 
Resolutions : 
1. Resolved, That the Banking Capital of the Bank of tbe State ought to bo reduced to its 
original amount of actual capital, to wit : the sum of $1,123,357. 
2. Resolved, That the other funds now used by the Bank as Banking Capital ought to be called 
in and applied to tbe discharge of the Public Debt. 
Here then again the Committee of Ways and Means, of which I had the 
honor still to be Chairman, strove to retrace the erroneous policy into which 
the Bank bad led the State, and to remove the borrowed capital which embar-
rassed both the Bank and the State. It was made clear to demonstration, that 
the State annually suffered loss by its continuance, while the Bank bad thereby 
become a vampire sucking out its vitals. But the effort was all in vain. The 
Bank mustered all its forces to the conflict. Again were _seen its officials 
treading the avenues to this Hall, and exercising all their power over the 
members; and the result again was a voto by indirection-an indefinite post-
ponement of the Report and Resolutions. It was vain any longer to expect 
from this Bank a consideration for the public good, where its own power was 
concerned. With them it was aut Ccesar, aut nullus. And like the Censor 
who saw that bis country's fate was involved in that of her antagonist, I have 
been forced to the conclusion that the welfare of the Bank and State cannot 
coexist, and therefore Delenda est Carthago. 
Two years have passed since 1846, and where are we now ? W c have a Bank 
which is liable at any moment to be called on to pay $1,463,889, with only 
$182,204 of assets immediately available; which has $94,000 of Specie to pay 
$772,215 of circulation; which is reduced to the necessity of issuing Time 
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Bills at 12 per cent. to pay current demands; and which, by its own showing, 
ha~ surik nearly one-third of the actual capital which the State bas placed in 
i:s hands. This is the progress of affairs. Where they will reach if tbe Bank 
be permitted to continue, we may not say with certainty; but it is not difficult 
to conjecture. I say again, Delenda est Carthago, or else the State must rue 
the day of its continuance. 
5. Eut let us take up the next proposition for which the friends of the Bank 
contend. They say that our faith, pledged to the Foreign Creditor, requires 
th:t the Bank should be rechartered. 
I have examined this matter so fully in my opening Speech, that I had 
thought it almost useless to add anything further, But it is so much pressed, 
that a few remarks may be useful in dissipating any doubts which may have 
been excited. The Foreign Debt which the State owes is one million of fj 
per cent. Bonds, payable one-half in 1858; and the other half in 1868. The 
principal part of the money borrowed is at present loaned out to the citizens of 
Charleston_at 6 per cent., and is secured by Mortgage of their Houses, and the 
guarantee of the City of Charleston. It is scarcely possible to find a debt 
protected with more ample security. The interest paid by the debtors is suffi-
cient to pay the interest due' the public creditor, ancl is secured in the same 
manner as the principal. Could any creditor desire further security; and is it 
not merely for the sake of raising difficulty that it is urged, that the creditor 
would regard the profits of the Bank as of any consequence as further security? 
If the Bank should be wound up at once, these moneys, as fast as they are paid 
in, could either be applied to pay off the creditors from whom they were bor-
rowed; or if they decline receiving payment, the money could be securely 
invested in such securities as they themselves might approve. Can anything 
be more simple or practicable than these arrangements? 
But take the other plan for which the Bank insists. Let the Bank be con-
tinued, and the money when paid in by the Charleston borrowers is then to 
be loaned out by the Bank on commercial paper, subject to all the chances of 
banking. What must be the result? By the Bank's own showing, they will 
not make enough profit to pay the interest and exchange, and they will cer-
tainly run the hazard of losing some of the principal. Is it not clear to demon-
atration, then, that the plan which we propose of winding up the Bank, would 
be far more t<: the advantage of the Foreign Creditors, than that of continuing 
it, as the other side propose ; and does not every one see that the foreign 
creditor himself would prefer it greatly? I would be perfectly willing to hazard 
the question on the answer which the creditor would make, when he came to 
understand the que~tion in all its ~earings. 
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Practically the question would never in any event reach this stage. Five 
per cent. Bonds can never be in such demand that they cannot at any time be 
purchasetl up at par; and if we now had the money in band, there is scarcely 
a doubt t].iat the greatet'. part of these Bonds could be purchased up greatly 
below par. Every quotation in Europe of American securities verifies this 
declaration; and although none of these particular Bonds may be in the market, 
I venture the assertion, that a fitting agent, with the money in hand, could 
readily enough have them forthcoming, and save something handsome to the ! i 
State. No agent of the Bank will ever succeed, simply because be will under-
stand which way the inclination of his principal tends. 
6. But it is urged by the defenders of the Bank, that it will greatly distress 
the debtors of the Bank, and put the State to great inconvenience to provide 
for the public debt, if the Bank be not rechartered. 
I answer, that precisely the reverse will be the fact. In regard to the 
debtors of the Bank, the course to be taken, if the Bank were put in liquidation, 
would be merely to require payments in such instalments as the liabilities of 
the Bank would require. This would, with the sale of Stocks, probably reriuire 
not more than l of their debts per annum. To convert a Bank debt, payable 
in 60 or 90 days, into one payable in equal instalments in eight years, so far 
from distressing debtors, would be a vast accommodation to them. It would· 
be equivalent to an extended relief law. Of ·course it woult1 only be extended 
where the debt is made secure. In other cases, common prudence even now 
would require the Bank to bring it to a settlement. 
So too with the public debt, the adjustment is still more simple. This debt, 
exclusive of the Fire Loan, would be extinguished by the Sinking Fund of 
$541,416, now in the hands of the Bank. It would only be necessary to call 
in this amount by instalments, in 1850 and 1852, when the debt is payable, 
and the whole public debt, exclusive of the Fire Loan, would be paid; and such 
a call would not be greater than $180,000 per annum, out of assets amounting 
to three millions and a half of dollars. The Fire Loan debt is not due, as 
already stated, until 1858, 1868, 1870, and would be met by collecting the 
money loaned out to the citizens of Charleston and the remaining assets of the 
Bank, and oithl'r paying off the debt in advance, or investing the money in a 
form to meet the debt when it shall become due. 
If, as the Bank contends, their assets are all sound, then upon the winding 
up of its concerns the State will be freed from the load of debt which now 
embarrasses her, and will have one million of dollars returned her for the 
capital put into the Bank. If, as we fear, part of this capital shall have been 
sunk, we shall have the balance, whatever it may be, and shall know the worst. 
The State Treasury will then o;ce more become the simple instrument which 
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was intended by the Constitution. 'l'he constituted authorities will then have 
recovered their control over the finances of the country. 'rhe people will then 
be able to sec and understand all that is done by their representatives in their 
name. The State will have thrown aside its master, and we shall r.ll once 
more breathe freely. 
Finally. Now is the time for action. Already has the tocsin been sounded 
which is calling t'Jgether the whole money power in the State to compel a 
recharter of this Bank. The friends of the Bank already announce that if they 
cannot get a charter, no other Bank shall. Reckless and ruthless, they have 
ever acted upon the maxim to destroy or govern. And they are true to it, 
when thJy utter this threat against the other Banks. Their design is to 
compel those Banks to unite in giving the Bank of the State a new charter, in 
order to get one for themselves. By a concurrence of accidents, which has 
marvellously the air of design, the charters of nearly all expire about the same 
time; and it is plain that their interest must combine them in this common 
cause. If we do not at once settle what shall be done with the Bank of the 
State, their combination will be too strong to be resisted. Already have we 
exhibited the mighty influence of the Bank of the State, even when standing 
alone. But give her the a_id of the Bank of Charleston, with its three millions, 
and. that of all the other Banks whose charters then come up for renewal, and 
it requires no prophet to foretell .the result. 
It is our duty therefore to act now. "\Ve now have time to carry out gentle 
and gradual measures, that can be adjusted to snit times and seasons. The 
people have come up to the consideration of the question now, and are prepared 
to sustain our action. If we continue to beguile them, and keep back from any 
action, some revulsion in commerce, some sudden calamity to the Bank, may 
bring down a tide of public indignation which will brook no delay, and may 
sweep the Bank and its debtors into irretrievable ruin. Let us therefore not 
be led aside by any of the various Resolutions that are now before the House. 
Most of them arc merely intended to gain time and pass by the moment for 
action. The Bank well knows that there is a tide in public, as well as in 
private affairs. They feel the tide of public opinion now setting bard against 
them; and they think to run into an eddy, until the current has set past them. 
That eddy is sought to be made by the crowd of Resolutions on the table. 
Those therefore who think as I do, and are really in earnest, must take up 
something distinct and tangible; something which begins the ending, however 
distant that end may be. And for these reasons I have brought forward the 
distinct Resolutions upon which I desire to take a direct vote of the House. 
I well know that every effort will be made to Q,void that vote, and to dispose of 
>; 
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the subject by a side wind. But I see indications in this House that the day 
of side winds has gone by, and that at last we shall be able to bring the matter 
to a direct and substantive vote. 
Mr. Chairman, I have done. I have discharged my duty. I have deliv-
ered my testimony and my reasons. I have contributed all that I can bring 
together to redeem the State from a thraldom which trammels her action-
from a master which has bound her with that most degrading of all chains, the 
chain of a money power. I have exposed the mazes of that labyrinth in which 
the people of South Caroiina have been made to wander for the last 30 years, 
in the vain search after the Philosopher's stone. I have sought to break the 
wand which has controlled our State, and now swerves its action and paralyzes 
its free energies. I have endeavored to substitute for the machinations of a 
central money power, the free elements of reason and truth. If I shall fail, I 
have nothing wherewith to reproach myself. It is upon this House-it is upon 
you, the Representatives of South Carolina, that the responsibility of action 
now devolves. l\fay• the Sovereign Ruler of Nations direct your understand-
ings into the Truth, and guide your action for the best interests of South 
Carolina. 
-
s. 
